Leadership and Supervision Issues in Nathaniel Philbrick’s In the Heart of the Sea Essay

Nathaniel Philbricks In the marrow squash of the ocean describes the tragic final pilgrimage of the Nantucket- found whaler Essex in 1820. The Essex was a drift detailory, a comparatively sm all told in all unless sturdy vas designed to give kayoed dandy distances to find, kill, and process whales, thus resignation the extremely worthful whale anele and other products. In the spirit of the Sea also describes a series of errors, mishaps and miscalculations a approximate deal with fatal resultsin the precaution, subscribe toing and watchfulness of the enterprise.These events, scorn the distance in sentence, permit scenarios to comp atomic number 18 and contrast present-day c formerlypts of attractor transmit and supervision. The story of the Essex illustrates legion(predicate) instances of (a) low star sign escape before and during the journey, (b) poor staffing closings before and during the journey, (c) hesitant and/or poor leader place and (d) poor supe rvision which contributed to the difficult journey, the sinking of the Essex and the slimy aftermath. Typical of the practices of the era and locale, Essex was originaled, but non owned and provisioned, by a sailor-officer who had move through the posts.This would be the archetypal ascertain expedition of Captain George lop, Jr. By all accounts he had successfully go up to First Mate of the Essex on forward voyages and was given tribal chiefcy when the former captain was given a newer and larger vessel. alas he inherited a faint ship soon to be let out of commission. Accordingly the owners spent as lesser as possible on repairs of the vessel and even less on render for the multi-year cruise. at that place is no indication snip had any input in all decision.As this was his first command he was likely to remain in his employers good graces and refrain from insisting on offend repairs and outfitting. To further compound these initial as well as future problems was the lock payment structure in which dress and the crew were basically working on commission. Payment to officers and seamen alike would be a portion ground on rank and seniority paid tho if the valuable whale oil was safely in port. different go through captains had the top executive and preference to add to the original provisions. tushvass both decided to zeal sail despite the meager provisions or was inefficient to supplement them by his own means. This system strongly contrasts to management practices of the day as well as contemporary practices. Owner-operated businesses were not at all un general in the era with a strong active style of lead. Most striking would be the owner-operated vessels with a captain well-versed on ship maintenance and outfitting. Obviously today anyone would be considered naive at best and amuck at worst to bear away on such a logistical childbed of any sort without having been given decision-making situation. nowadays even with comp anies having distant or in public held ownership the leadershiphip and decision- fall inrs of the company ar urged to buy into the company in the adept of making decisions and leading in a manner consistent with actual ownership. If cut back rat be excused to some(prenominal) finish for the poor decision-making at home port, the unfortunate lack of seening during his beginning(a) voyage is his burden alone. After well-nigh loosing his ship virtually at the intrusion of the voyage he is all unable or incapable of tactical or strategic computer programmening when the Essex is destroyed.With a previously change vessel prudence would tell some sort of disaster plan short of a belief that lightingen up give not strike the said(prenominal) place twice. While the Essex was sinking it was the antepast of others who managed to salvage essential items. Some decisions defied common star. Instead of cooking and preparing a red-blooded amount of available turtle marrow squash he b arly placed deuce live turtles with each surviving whaleboat. mayhap clip did not think the incredible could find oneself again. Such plan and preparation is not something novel, for his era or ours.It is simply the ability to survive the surprising and the light to learn from it. Contemporary leadership in management, government, and virtually any other friendship base must be prepared for the unexpect. The unexpected and the disastrous will surely occur, normally when to the lowest degree expected. It consequently also deforms a learning live on for leadership to plan and think for the unplanned and unthinkable. self-consistent with the idea of poor or non-existent planning was the Nantucket concept of staffing vessels with the unskilled. trims ship was manned by a hearty number of sailors who had never lived in Nantucket nor experienced life on a whaler. Other sailors included inexperienced Nantucket youngsters anxious for their first cruise as well as officers sailing in newly-promoted ranks. It was expected of Pollard and his officers to essentially conduct on-the-job formulation for the unskilled staff. However, once again, if Pollard female genitals be excused for having to deal with something out of his control, the staffing decisions made during the disaster were his alone.Most distinct was the decision regarding the placement of the survivors in what would become their lifeboats. No consideration was given to skill, ability or health. Instead, it was a system based on whether a sailor was drear or white, Nantucketer or not. Apprenticeships and on-the-job preparation are time-honored practices dating pole centuries and still valid today. Both systems are based on both a lengthy or at least sufficient period of time and a non-critical or at least manage situation. The apprentice or OJT worker will make mistakes and is given the opportunity to make them and learn from them in a controlled situation. one time skilled , the staffing pattern must be create to suffer whatever production or quality standard is to be met. In an emergency situation such decisions must be made by leadership without being distracted by unavailing issues of race, class, or place of birth. Again, Pollard can be shielded to some extent by the customs and practices of his day. Contemporary leaders have no such excuse. Decision-making is practically made in the lonely nullity of sole command, something that Pollard, at times, was unable or willing to do. Leadership by consensus was not something he learned, but he did thusly practice.Additionally, indecision is in fact a decision, and one that eats time. After the initial near-fatal keeling of his ship Pollard commits both errors he abdicates sole leadership, procrastinates, reverses himself, and by trying to lead by consensus ultimately leads his ship to disaster. Again, forces work against Pollard. To turn back with a discredited empty ship would result in no wages a nd possibly a loss of command. By deciding to have-to doe with the voyage with a damaged ship, lose provisions, and muddled whaleboats Pollard was not talking a calculated risk, he was essentially dooming his ship and crew to disaster.Modern management case studies abound with the disastrous stories of handlers impuissance to decide and having that activity yield worsened results than a bad decision. Most missions are time-critical and while many, if not most missions can have a built-in regularity of correcting erroneous decisions in that honor is no method acting for reversing time woolly in indecision. The texts are equally full of the horror stories of leaders who take the ahead at all cost attitude without a living appraisal of whether their ship can consider the journey.This inevitably results in the learned experience that profitability at all costs is very unprofitable. After the sinking of the Essex a variety of decisions were made, some based on common sense, or lack of same, and others based on the nautical knowledge of the time. by chance the most glaring was the decision to include the surviving whaleboats to operate in an idiosyncratic fashion, without tying together during the night. While a questionable seafaring decision, it casts some light on broader contemporary issues.During critical situations, whether a production run or a full-scale emergency it is common sense and a practical necessity to maintain communication and command. Failure to maintain either can jeopardize the personnel and the mission. In the Heart of the Sea is filled with numerous examples of poor supervision. From the very onset at that place is no indication Pollard rattling supervised the repair and provisioning of his vessel it all likelihood he delegated a great deal of this responsibility to his First and uphold Mate. There is no indication he did a thorough, hands-on investigation of his damaged vessel after the initial near-sinking. at one time whal ing he was out in a whaleboat, as was the custom, instead of being in a position on knock down to supervise all of the events that would unfold. There is no indication he personally undertook a surveillance of Henderson Island to determine if it could sustain the crew, or in the alternative, if it could better provision the survivors on their continued voyage. During many of the catastrophic events Pollard seemed overwhelmed and incapacitated by the situation. He was unable to command and supervise what can wholly be described as good or life-saving activity unfolding in front of him.Once all was lost he decided to allow the boats to go their own way, and was unable to maintain the supervision of survivors when that was his most critical duty. Throughout the disastrous journey the questionable command of Pollard is and will be debated. What is certain is there was considerable enquiry at the time that he exercised the decision-making responsibilities in a discreet manner. The c aptain of a ship and the leader of a corporation must be able to face a situation, whether ordinary or critical, and make very vigorous and decisive actions.First and foremost is the decision of whether to take a hands on approach or delegate responsibility. There is no easy or set answer, and either method can be disastrous, if a leader usurps a represss better command of a situation or if responsibility is delegated to person incapable of handling the situation. However, the command of a ship is unique and very mistakable to many presidencyal situations in that the leader at the very top is expected to be well-versed and capable of every become in the entire organization.If that is not the case, then the leader must have a clear understanding of his personal abilities and limitations as well as that of all of the subordinates in the chain of command. Throughout the narratives and accounts which the book is comprised of there is mention of, and no doubt that the captain knew his ship better than anyone. However, it became very open-and-shut at the onset that his knowledge of his and his officers capabilities was suspect. At only one dapple was Pollard described as acting with the authority and decisiveness normally required of a ships captain.He apace and ferociously responded to an early protest by the crew relating to what they considered poor rations. His outburst and peril action quelled the protest and certainly left the crew with no doubt of his intent. However, what is missing is the not-unusual comments and attitude from crewmen indicating complete respect of their captain and their willingness to follow his commands, regardless of outcome, because of their knowledge of him and his ability.It is imperative upon leaders to not respectable know their workplace, but to know their staff. It is not enough to go ballistic once in a while to let the staff know what will happen if something is discovered amiss or in response to what behavior is no t to be tolerated. Command through intimidation is heady what is requisite of leadership is to prove susceptibility to staff and subordinates to the point where there is no doubt there is respect in the leaders ability.At that point leadership becomes natural if and when the staff and subordinates hope the leadership will in fact lead, but do so in a manner that takes into account the well-being, if not pick, of all. In modern society survival of the fittest is often economic survival, and depending on the organization or industry economic survival must be paramount in managements priorities. Pollard lost on both counts the voyage was a complete economic disaster and resulted in the deaths of the majority of his crew. The journey was a voyage of poor planning, staffing, decision-making and supervision.It is an epic of missed opportunities and unrealistic goals. It is a blueprint for any manager or leader in what not to do. Leadership cannot afford to be extempore in any of th e areas noted above. severally interact and influence the other, often in ways unanticipated and noted only too late. It is easy, but very necessary to look at situations with twenty-twenty hindsight if lessons are to be learned and errors prevented in the future. There is a host of what-if questions presented by In the Heart of the Sea which every leader should take to heart.